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ABSTRACT 
This study aims at understanding the recent proliferation of social enterprises, a class of 
organizations explicitly committed to advancing non-financial stakeholders’ interests, against the 
historical backdrop of economic financialization, which institutionalized shareholder value 
maximization as the sole legitimate purpose of firms. These increasing claims of an 
organizational identity that is deviant from the dominant institutional logic pose an intriguing 
puzzle to organization theories. This study addresses this puzzle by examining why (mechanism) 
and when (facilitating context) organizations adopt an institutionally-deviant identity. Informed 
by an inductive qualitative analysis, this study first identifies two routes to a deviant identity: 
first, consistent with the current organizational identity literature, organizations strategically 
adopt a deviant identity to appeal to the stakeholders who are ‘disembedded’ from the dominant 
logic; and second, reminiscent of identity movements, organizations also politically claim a 
deviant identity to disassociate themselves from and transform the existing institutional 
framework. These arguments were then tested in the context of the Certified B Corporations, a 
growing form of social enterprises. The quantitative analysis supports both predictions by 
finding that claims of the B Corporation identity was facilitated both by the stakeholder 
discontent with the shareholder-centered approach and by the salient negative consequences of 
the economic financialization. (201 words) 
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To B or Not To B? 
Understanding the Emergence of Social Entrepreneurship in the Financialized Economy 
The first decade of the 21st century was marked by the proliferation of social enterprises, a new 
class of organizations that strive to advance diverse stakeholder interests simultaneously, as 
opposed to focusing only on maximizing shareholder returns (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011). 
This phenomenon is intriguing particularly because these organizations emerged against the 
historical backdrop of the financialization of the economy (Davis, 2009; Krippner, 2011), where 
the maximization of shareholder value has become the sole legitimate purpose of business. This 
misfit between organizational characteristics and their normative environment becomes even 
more accentuated by the explicitness of the claim that these new organizations make. Only 
during the first decade of the century, various new organizational vehicles were introduced to 
house these social enterprises, highlighting their distinct claim about themselves. Examples 
include Benefit Corporations, Flexible Purpose Corporations, Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Companies (L3Cs), and Certified B Corporations. Given that traditional for-profit businesses 
also have taken diverse stakeholders into their business considerations, what makes these 
organizations novel may not be so much their commitment to non-economic values as their 
explicit emphasis on such commitment and their desire to publicly declare such identity through 
adopting distinctive labels. Considering institutional theory and the pressure towards conformity, 
this recent rise of social entrepreneurship at the culmination of economic financialization 
provides an intriguing empirical puzzle. Juxtaposing the two contemporary trends makes each 
almost an anomaly to the other, problematizing the current understanding of organizational 
identity and institutions. Why is it that an increasing number of organizations publicly claim that 
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they care for diverse stakeholders, when there is a strong institutional pressure towards giving 
the sole privilege to the financial stakeholder over all others?  
The current literature of organizational identity and institutions has yet to offer an 
adequate explanation to this phenomenon, because it has largely focused on organizations 
forming their identity in conformity with institutional pressure (Glynn, 2008). Studies have 
found that organizations strive to differentiate themselves from peers, but only within the 
perimeter sanctioned by institutions as legitimate (King, Clemens, & Fry, 2011; Pedersen & 
Dobbin, 1997). Therefore, the literature provides little explanation about why organizations 
would explicitly claim to be deviant from what is institutionally prescribed. Although not at the 
organizational level, previous research on identity movement documented cases of 
institutionally-deviant identity claims in such contexts as gay rights movement (Armstrong, 
2002), LGBT ministers (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010), and French gastronomy (Rao, Monin, & 
Durand, 2003). These studies commonly suggested that isomorphic conformity is not the only 
option at the juncture of identity and institution, and that actors do sometimes actively diverge 
from the constraining institutions through claiming a deviant identity. However, what is still not 
clear is why and when such divergence would happen, particularly in relation to the existing 
institutions. In other words, although we know that a deviant identity is sometimes explicitly 
claimed to constitute an identity movement aimed at transforming the dominant institutional 
framework (Armstrong, 2002), and its success is dependent upon diverse factors along with the 
movement trajectory (Rao et al., 2003), there still is a dearth of knowledge on how the 
organizational claim of a deviant identity is motivated by the very institution that constrains such 
divergence.  
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This research addresses this gap in research by theorizing why and when institutionally-
deviant identities emerge. Institutionally-deviant identity refers to the organizational identity that 
deviates from the identity prescription of the dominant institutional logic, which refers to the 
broad cultural beliefs and rules that fundamentally structure cognition, decision making and 
action in a field (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). In this study's context, explicit social enterprise 
labels, such as Certified B Corporations, can be an example of deviant identity because the 
central claim of such labels deviates from the institutional prescription to maximize shareholder 
values. Informed by the qualitative evidence from Certified B Corporations, this study proposes 
two mechanisms that lead to deviant identity claims: strategic and political. First, organizations 
can adopt a deviant identity to strategically comply with or appeal to the external constituents 
who are already disembedded from the dominant logic. In such cases, organizations are more 
likely to claim a deviant identity in the context where the dominant logic is weaker, with 
stakeholders showing preferences against the dominant logic. In addition, organizations may also 
claim a deviant identity to dissociate themselves from and explicitly challenge the dominant 
logic. This politically-motivated identity deviation is more likely to occur in the context where 
the dominant logic is stronger, with strict enforcement of institutional rules causing grievance 
and stigmatization. These theoretical ideas are then tested in the specific context of Certified B 
Corporations, a rapidly growing community of social enterprises. Drawing on the archival data 
of B Corporations as well as their industry characteristics, I examined how the B Corporation 
identity claims are systematically predicted by external conditions reflecting the dominant logic 
of financialized and shareholder-centered governance.  
By studying the emergence of deviant identities, this study expands the current 
understanding on the relationship between institutions and organizational identity. Following 
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Glynn’s (2008) pioneering notion that institutions may not just constrain but enable new 
identities, this study shows that strong imposition of institutional rules somewhat ironically 
provides motivational fuel to claim a deviant identity. This ultimately suggests that the 
institutional influence on organizational identity may be more complex and diverse than mere 
isomorphic conformity. This study also contributes to the literature of institutional divergence 
and change. Research has found that institutions can be affected through constructing and 
performing particular identities (Creed et al., 2010; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Rao et al., 
2003). The current study extends this idea by finding that such institution-altering potential of 
identity is realized under specific historical contexts created by the very institution that the actors 
struggle to overcome. Finally, this study enhances our understanding of the emerging phenomena 
of social entrepreneurship and hybrid organizations. Complementing earlier research that 
focused on the internal struggle and ingenuity of hybrid organizing (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), this study sheds light to the macro-level social and 
economic conditions conducive to the pursuit of social-economic hybrids. 
 
CONTEXT: CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS 
Since the 1970s, the U.S. economy has undergone an historical transformation towards 
‘financialization,’ which denotes the upsurge of financial stakeholders’ influence over corporate 
governance and the significant increase of financial industry’s share of the overall economy 
(Davis, 2009; Krippner, 2011). This has resulted in the rise of the shareholder-centered 
capitalism in which maximizing economic gains for shareholders became the supreme purpose of 
corporate governance (Useem, 1999). Backed by the agency theory and the contractarian view of 
the firm, this increasingly widespread view endorsed “shareholder primacy”, arguing that 
6 
 
shareholders are the only legitimate constituency for whom firms should serve because they are 
the sole residual claimants, meaning that maximizing their interests automatically maximizes the 
interests of other stakeholders (Davis, 2005; Fama & Jensen, 1983). As the American economy 
went through the crisis of the late 70s and neoliberal deregulations in the 80s, this shareholder-
centered view firmly established itself as the new standard, the dominant logic in the domain of 
corporate governance and business organizing. The rein of American corporations was taken 
from the executives with manufacturing and marketing backgrounds to the hands of financial 
executives and the external financial market (Fligstein, 2001; Mizruchi, 2010). With the rise of 
the shareholder-centered logic, even the same corporate policy was received differently: the 
market response to the stock repurchase plan dramatically shifted from negative to positive in the 
mid-80s (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). In the same vein, corporate practices for non-financial 
stakeholders such as CSR (corporate social responsibility) initiatives were strongly criticized as 
neglect of the fiduciary duty to shareholders and an arbitrary waste of shareholders’ money for 
‘dubious social good (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2010).’ 
 Within this historical context emerged the Certified B Corporations as a deviant social 
category. Any company, regardless of the legal structure or industry, can become a B 
Corporation by being certified from B Lab, a non-profit organization that started in 2007 and 
currently manages the entire community of a thousand B Corporations worldwide. B 
Corporations are deviant in the current institutional context in that the key feature of the 
certification process involves the corporate charter amendment that legally mandates officers and 
managers to consider the interests of all the stakeholders affected by firm operation, not just 
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shareholders (Marquis, Klaber, & Thomason, 2010).
1
 Also, becoming a B Corporation is 
adopting a collective identity through joining a social category. Certified firms carry the B 
Corporation symbol in their products, brands, corporate reports, and their webpages, as a public 
statement of their commitment to diverse stakeholder values. In addition, B Corporations 
collaborate with each other to conduct public relations campaigns for the entire community, 
which is aimed at increasing their collective exposure and promoting their unique value to the 
wider audience. In the current institutional context, therefore, being certified as a B Corporation 
carries additional institutional meaning that is greater than a mere certification. It is an 
organizational act of publicly identifying with a deviant social category that significantly 
diverges from the dominant prescription of ‘how a firm should be governed.’  
 The certification process involves the following two steps. First, aspiring firms complete 
the ‘B Impact Assessment’ that measures the degree to which a firm’s activities are geared 
towards social and environmental benefits, in addition to the shareholder’s economic benefits. 
Specifically, firms are required to report their performance in five distinctive areas including 
accountability, employees, consumers, community, and environment, and they can proceed to the 
next step only if their score exceeds a certain threshold (80 points out of 200). The 2011 B 
Corporation Annual Report shows that 1,017 firms applied for this first stage and only 370 firms 
passed the threshold since its inception in 2007 (Sustainable Industries, 2011). The self-reported 
‘B Impact Assessment’ is reviewed by the B Lab staff, and additional documentation is required 
for heavily weighted answers. One out of five reports is subject to on-site review by B Lab staff. 
This first step ensures that the B Corporation certification is not a hollow claim of a ‘do-gooder’ 
façade but a substantial reflection of the firm identity.  For the second step, those firms who 
                                                          
1
 B Corporations are different from Benefit Corporations. While the former is a certification system, the latter is a 
legal form of business organizations that has to be legally recognized by the state legislature. Both are driven by B 
Lab, and Certified B Corporations are considered as an organizational prototype of Benefit Corporations. 
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passed the first threshold now amend their corporate charter to incorporate the consideration of 
diverse stakeholders’ interests into the fiduciary duties of directors and officers, and gain 
shareholder approval of this amendment. After successful completion of these two steps, the firm 
is officially certified as a B Corporation and become subjected to biannual reviews that 
determine the renewal of the certification. Although the community includes many young startup 
companies, technically no B Corporation can be founded as a B Corporation, because firms with 
less than six months of full operation are not eligible for application. 
Since the first 19 B Corporations certified in 2007, currently 990 firms are certified, 
located in 32 different countries (as of April 2014). Most of them are privately-held small 
businesses typically with less than 200 full-time employees (Sustainable Industries, 2012). Since 
2012, the composition of the B Corporation community underwent a significant change as B Lab 
initiated a global expansion to diverse countries in South America, Asia and Africa. For this 
reason and other issues regarding data availability, the current research employed the data of B 
Corporations which were certified up to 2011. Table 1 describes the distribution of B 
Corporations in the sample across major industry categories, and Figure 1 shows the yearly 
change of industry composition of B Corporations. 
================== 
Insert Table 1 about here 
================== 
================== 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
================== 
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THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
Content Analysis on Motives behind B Corporation Certification 
One plausible way to understand why organizations claim a deviant identity may be 
looking into their self-reported motives. To do so, I conducted an inductive content analysis on 
each B Corporation’s self-reported account of why they became certified, which was retrieved 
from the B Lab website. Among the 514 firms in the sample, 390 firms provided a meaningful 
account. The average length of the text was 300 words, ranged from 13 to 662 words. An MBA 
research assistant and I conducted an inductive analysis of this data, following the coding 
procedure of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). We separately conducted open-coding of a 
portion of data (up to the point where no more new code shows up) and constructed a 
preliminary structure of thematic codes. We then compared our structures, and resolved any 
discrepancies through discussions. Next, using this integrated structure of theoretical themes, we 
conducted focused-coding on the rest of the sample. The outcome of this analysis is presented in 
the following Table 2. The table summarizes 16 first-order motives for the B Corporation 
certification, which were aggregated to make 7 second-order motives. These were again grouped 
to form two overarching theoretical mechanisms for adopting a deviant identity: namely, 
strategic vs. political motivations. 
================== 
Insert Table 2 about here 
================== 
First, firms were motivated to claim the B Corporation identity to strategically advance 
their organizational interest. The analysis showed that firms became certified as a B Corporation 
to differentiate themselves from the competitors, as well as to better communicate this distinct 
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identity with their stakeholders. Specifically, about 10% of the sample firms indicated that they 
adopted the B Corporation identity to differentiate themselves from the “green-washers” 
proliferating in the “hype of social responsibility,” and to “set an example of social and 
environmental responsibility” for other businesses. Also, 22.3% of the firms stated that their 
certification was aimed at “broadcasting”, “proving”, and “demonstrating [their] commitment to 
social and environmental values” to the external audience, including the general public (9.74%), 
specific stakeholders (7.18%), and consumer/clients (5.38%). In combination, this evidence 
suggests that firms adopt the B Corporation identity to make themselves more appealing to the 
external stakeholders who are discontent with the dominant shareholder-centered approach and 
sympathetic with this emerging idea of promoting social and environmental values through 
business. 
Second, the claim of the B Corporation identity was also politically-driven. The content 
analysis indicated that the B Corporation certification was not only a strategic response to 
stakeholder preferences but also a political action representing the resistance to the norm of 
shareholder primacy through engaging in an identity-based movement. Specifically, 26% of the 
sample firms stated that they became a B Corporation to “preserve” and “formalize” their 
identity as a social enterprise that they cherished for a long time, “even before knowing the term.” 
Another 11.3% of the firms also indicated that the certification “substantiated” and “validated” 
their identity by holding them “accountable for the practices [they] preach”, consequently 
enabling them to “walk the talk” and “to keep [their] values intact.” This desire to express their 
identity did not stop at mere public declaration but extended to the creation of higher-level 
changes “to add an esteemed legitimacy to [their] social and environmental efforts.” 18% of the 
firms indicated that they became certified to change “the way people perceive success in the 
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business world” and to show that “doing well by doing good is a large and growing trend,” that 
consequently will redefine “the way we do business.” Similarly, 13.6% of the firms exhibited a 
strong sentiment for social change, stating that their certification is aimed at “creating a new 
economy with a new set of rules” where “business must be reimagined ... so that companies can 
be financially profitable while also being socially responsible and ecologically beneficial.” In 
line with these motives, almost a third of the firms (31%) highlighted that they consider the B 
Corporation certification as joining a movement, where they “unify with other like-minded 
businesses” to influence “other ordinary businesses through their collective voice,” consequently 
resulting in “a widespread adoption of B Corp standards.” These findings suggest that for a 
substantial number of B Corporations, the certification was driven by political motivations that 
go beyond mere strategic pacification of stakeholders. 
While these findings suggest two key mechanisms behind the deviant identity claim, it is 
hard to believe that these self-reported motives are entirely guileless, given that firms tend to 
engage in impression management through public statements. Therefore, I drew on existing 
literature and developed hypotheses on the facilitating conditions of the B Corporation 
emergence, an empirical examination of which will lend supports to the two inductively-derived 
mechanisms behind deviant identity claims. For such contextual conditions, I focus on industry 
characteristics because industry is one of the closest empirical proxies of organizational fields 
(Heugens & Lander, 2009) and the unique history and the consequent competitive environment 
of industries largely determines the power relations among firms and stakeholders, creating 
variance in the institutionalization of the shareholder-centered logic across industries (Campbell 
& Leon, 1990). Further, I expect that industrial conditions affect the entrepreneur’s generalized 
perception of the external environment because existing organizations in the industry provides “a 
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training ground for future entrepreneurs (Hannan & Freeman, 1986: 63),” and entrepreneurs’ 
knowledge is often rooted in their own past experience of dealing with industry-specific 
stakeholder demands (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Simons & Roberts, 2008). Finally, industry has 
been the most frequently used unit of analysis in previous studies on the financialization and the 
shareholder-centered governance (Fligstein & Shin, 2007; Goldstein, 2012; Tomaskovic-Devey 
& Lin, 2011) 
One alternative approach to the industry-level analysis would be the firm-level analysis, 
predicting the B Corporation certification by firm-level attributes. However, a rigorous 
implementation of this approach is very difficult due to the lack of available data. To conduct the 
firm-level analysis, the researcher has to identify the matched sample – the firms that are similar 
with typical B Corporations but did not adopt the B Corporation label. Identifying a 
representative matched sample is a challenging task, but even if one succeeds in doing so, 
gaining information about each of these control firms is even more challenging because B 
Corporations are typically small- to mid-sized private enterprises and unlike public corporations, 
credible and accurate information about these small businesses is not publicly available. More 
importantly, following Stinchcombe’s (1965) focus on social structure, studies of new form 
emergence have shown that new organizational forms emerge not based on the idiosyncrasy of 
individual entities but out of the nurturing conditions of the surrounding environment. This study 
also follows this tradition and traces the origin of B Corporations from the industry conditions in 
which the organizational candidates are embedded. 
Deviant Identity Claim as Strategic Action 
The first theme derived from the content analysis – strategic motivation – implies 
consistency with the extant organizational identity literature, which explains that organizations 
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form their identity to differentiate themselves in a way that they can appeal to the constituents 
providing critical resources for organizational survival (Albert & Whetten, 1985; King et al., 
2011). Specifically in the management-stakeholder relationship, organizational identity is 
considered as a joint construction of managers and diverse stakeholders, indicating that the 
process of identity construction is significantly attuned to the beliefs, values, and needs of 
stakeholders (Scott & Lane, 2000). Similarly, institutionalist view of organizational identity 
emphasizes that organizations craft their identity in conformity with institutional rules and 
beliefs in order to gain legitimacy, another kind of critical resource. For example, the survival 
rate of European universities increased when their identity is similar to other universities in the 
organizational field (Czarniawska & Wolff, 1998), and organizations in the same industry even 
followed the institutionalized template for naming themselves, which is supposedly the most 
individuating feature (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). Also, the content of organizational identity among 
Arizona Charter Schools was shaped in combination of the simultaneous effort to be similar to 
others in the field and to differentiate from them (King et al., 2011). In these perspectives, 
identity is understood as a symbolic representation of organizations, crafted for effectively 
managing organizational interface with the external environment and for ultimately securing 
organizational interest and survival.  
Extending this conception of organizational identity, this study proposes that 
organizations are more likely to adopt an institutionally-deviant identity when the external 
constituents exhibit pressure or preference against the current institutional logic. Normally, 
organizations craft their identity within the appropriate or taken-for-granted boundary due to a 
fear of receiving illegitimacy discount (Zuckerman, 1999). One plausible condition under which 
organizations can cross that institutionally-sanctioned boundary is when there is a breach 
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between the dominant logic and the preference of firms’ constituents. When organizations 
perceive that their important stakeholders are ‘disembedded’ from the dominant logic, they are 
more likely to follow the suit by strategically adopting a deviant identity that resonates with the 
rebellious stakeholders. For example, when the investors, consumers, or the workforce in the 
industry exhibit the signs of growing discontent with the shareholder-centered governance, firms 
will be more likely to adopt the B Corporation identity, hoping to achieve competitive advantage 
based on the effective differentiation from peers and better communication of the ideological 
alignment with stakeholders. 
Recently, the growing discontent or ‘disembeddedness’ from the shareholder-centered 
logic is becoming increasingly noticeable, with the rise of alternative views and business 
practices to the shareholder-centered logic. Critical perspectives on the neoliberal view of the 
firm are gradually gaining traction, such as stakeholder theory which argues for the equal 
ownership claim of non-financial stakeholders (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007). 
Simultaneously, large for-profit corporations are increasingly exposed to the call for corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), being demanded to contribute to the general social welfare which 
may not have a direct implication to the bottom line (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Also, a growing 
movement of socially responsible investment (SRI) is pressing businesses to go beyond 
shareholder value maximization by improving their practices on environmental, social, and 
governance issues (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). These emerging trends will be manifested by 
stakeholders preference against the shareholder-centered logic, which will in turn, influence 
firm's identity claim. 
Among diverse stakeholders, I first focus on investors, who through the years of 
financialization gained a significant influence over firms. As a part of the socially responsible 
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investment (SRI) movement, there has been a notable increase in the shareholder activism which 
somewhat ironically (from the standpoint of the neoliberal economics and the shareholder logic) 
used the power of shareholders to pressure firms to advocate the interest of under-protected 
stakeholders, such as the labor, the community, and the environment (Schueth, 2003). The more 
salient the socially-conscious shareholder activism is in the industry, the more organizations will 
become aware of the alternative investment sources that are no more subscribed to the traditional 
sense of shareholder value maximization. This perception will motivate organizations to publicly 
claim the identity that is also divergent from the shareholder primacy in order to gain more 
recognition and acceptance by these ‘disembedded’ investors. Thus, I expect that the increase of 
shareholder activism related to social issues will facilitate the emergence of B Corporations in 
the industry. 
H1: the degree of shareholder activism on social issues in the focal industry will be 
positively related to the emergence of B Corporations in the industry  
Second, consumers are another group of stakeholders that exert a strong influence on 
firms. Previous research has shown that consumer boycotts have been used to forcefully direct 
corporate attention and behavior to the areas of little profit implication, such as environmental 
and social impacts (Friedman, 1985; King, 2008). It was also found that the extra-institutional 
tactics such as consumer boycotts or protests increase when there are few legitimate avenues to 
channel the consumer influence into firms (John & Klein, 2003). Therefore, increasing consumer 
boycotts would indicate that consumers are generally alert to the corporate impact on social and 
environmental issues and are capable and motivated to express this commitment through 
collective action. As entrepreneurs observe more consumer boycotts in their industry, they are 
more likely to see the benefit of publicly endorsing their commitment to social and 
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environmental issues as well as their attentiveness to the voice of consumers. This expected gain 
will lead them to more explicitly claim that they are committed to diverse stakeholders as 
opposed to only shareholders. Therefore, I hypothesize that the more consumer boycotts occur in 
the industry, the more B Corporations will emerge. 
H2: the degree of consumer boycott in the focal industry will be positively related to the 
emergence of B Corporations in the industry 
Finally, the preference of employees is particularly important when it comes to 
organizational identity, because their acceptance and endorsement is critical for a successful 
formation of organizational identity (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013). The 
workforce demographics, such as average age and education level, reflect the preference of 
(potential) organizational members, which significantly affects organizational engagement with 
issues external to profit seeking. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) research found that 
employees are one of the most important sources of the demand for CSR (McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001), and firms use CSR as a strategy to attract skillful workforce (Bhattacharya, Sen, & 
Korschun, 2012). Indeed, popular press has already showed that the B Corporation label has 
proven to be effective in luring talents (Gellman & Feintzeig, 2013). 
I first focus on employee age based on the changing attitude towards the shareholder-
centered logic among younger generation workers. Institutional logics are imperfectly 
transmitted across generations (Zucker, 1988), and the same rule seems to apply to the historical 
trend of financialization, which has begun in the late 1970s and is purported to have reached its 
culmination at the turn of the century (Stout, 2012). Emerging evidence suggests that workers in 
the younger generations (e.g., Millennials) believe making money and doing good for society are 
compatible goals (O'Brien, 2012) and place higher priority on “helping others in need” than 
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“having a high-paying career” (Pew Research Center, 2010). These trends may indicate that 
younger generations feel more comfortable with diverging from the orthodox version of 
shareholder value maximization, being less subscribed to the traditionally dominant logic than 
their older peers. Therefore, it is likely that organizations in the field with younger workforce 
benefit more from adopting the B Corporation identity, as such an explicit symbol will be more 
positively received by (potential) employees. 
H3: average age of the workforce in the focal industry will be negatively related to the 
emergence of B Corporations in the industry 
The mean education level of the workforce may also be closely related to their preference 
with the dominant institutional logic. Specifically, the degree of education may be negatively 
associated with the subscription to the shareholder-centered logic because the level of education 
is in general positively correlated with the level of social and political liberalism (Weil, 1985). It 
is possible that employees with more education have a more politically liberal attitude and 
therefore more readily embrace the idea of social entrepreneurship, an egalitarian notion of 
business organizing. Furthermore, the idea of simultaneously considering diverse stakeholders 
can be an intellectually complex task. The shareholder-centered thinking had a broad appeal to 
the general public partly because it offered an easy-to-understand purpose of business and a 
quick and simple solution to many complex problems of corporate governance (Stout, 2012). In 
contrast, the alternative stakeholder-inclusive approach involves higher uncertainty and 
complexity and never offers a generic solution that is universally applicable to all cases 
(Freeman et al., 2007). Therefore, the idea of social entrepreneurship itself could be more readily 
accessible among the workforce with more education who would be more comfortable with 
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complex conceptual thinking. Thus, organizations are more likely to explicitly claim the social 
enterprise identity when their industry is populated with more educated workforce.  
H4: average education of the workforce in the focal industry will be positively related 
to the emergence of B Corporations in the industry 
 
Deviant Identity Claim as Political Action 
The second theme from the content analysis – political motivation – much resonates with 
the imagery of identity depicted in the studies of identity movement and identity work. In these 
studies, identities are not crafted to cater to the stakeholder preference, but expressed in 
opposition to the hostile environment that defines the focal identity as deviance. Recently, social 
movement literature has expanded its scope from ‘how’ to ‘why’ of mobilization, specifically 
focusing on the role of collective identity in motivating the emergence of movements (Polletta & 
Jasper, 2001). For example, Armstrong (2002) documented the historical shift in the logics 
underlying the gay rights movement in the San Francisco area. Since the 1970s, the purpose of 
the movement evolved from advancing collective interest to more actively proclaiming and 
embracing the LGBT identity with an explicit purpose of challenging the cultural and normative 
institution of heteronormativity. In the similar context, Creed and colleagues (2010) investigated 
the LGBT ministers who experienced salient institutional contradiction due to the discrepancy 
between their personal versus professional identity. This research found that these ministers 
actively embraced their ‘deviant’ identity and engaged in ‘identity work’ through which they 
became the agents for institutional change of their religion. Also, in the context of the historical 
development of the French Cuisine, Rao and colleagues (2003) showed how French chefs’ active 
19 
 
endorsement of a deviant identity led to the identity-based movement, which ultimately resulted 
in the shift of institutional logics in French gastronomy, from Traditional to Nouvelle Cuisine.  
In this stream of research, identity is not merely a symbolic tool to gain approval from 
external audience, but a political apparatus to problematize and challenge the taken-for-granted 
view. By explicitly identifying with a deviant category, actors publicly convey their departure 
from the conventional criteria that dictate ‘what is normal and what is not,’ explicitly severing 
their association with the current system and putting forward their opposition to the conventional 
ways of thinking. Simultaneously, by so doing, they join a collective political effort to change 
the normative framework, to the direction where their deviant identity would ultimately gain 
legitimacy (Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Tracey et al., 2011).  
This ‘political’ claim of a deviant identity will be facilitated by the increasing negativity 
associated with the dominant rules and norms. This is because organizations desire to avoid the 
stigma that comes with ‘being normal’ in such contexts. In essence, institutions are regulative 
systems, and inasmuch as rules provide stability and order, strict enforcement of them results in 
negative consequences. For example, French Traditional Cuisine was considered to deprive chefs 
of autonomy and freedom, turning chefs into technicians (Rao et al., 2003). The age-long 
institution of heteronormativity causes sufferings among those who transgress the strict boundary 
of heterosexuality (Armstrong, 2002; Creed et al., 2010). In addition, the mass manufacturing 
logic behind corporate franchise radios and industrial beers were seen as suffocating the rich 
cultural diversity and local identities (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Greve, Pozner, & Rao, 
2006). Simultaneously, institutions are constitutive of embedded actors’ identity (Clemens & 
Cook, 1999), and particular institutional logics are affiliated with corresponding identities 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Thus, by merely participating in the field which is dominated by 
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certain logic, a parallel identity is imposed on the organizational actors, making them perceived 
in a particular way, unless explicitly claiming otherwise. Therefore, as the institutionalization of 
the dominant logic gradually generates more negative consequences, organizations in the 
institutionalized field are put in a higher risk of obtaining undeserved stigma as ‘complicit’ in 
causing harms, regardless of whether they actually contributed to the negative consequences 
(Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). As this stigma attached to ‘being normal’ becomes 
more severe, organizations will be more strongly motivated to explicitly claim their departure 
from the current logic and choose to be ‘abnormal’ or ‘positively deviant,’ in order to protect 
themselves from institutionally-imposed ‘bad names.’ 
The historical wave of financialization and ever-increasing emphasis on efficiency and 
profit left enduring and widespread social problems particularly through its impact on labor. The 
introduction of flexible labor contracts and substantial cuts in employee benefits significantly 
infringed the postwar social pact between labor and capital that provided the crucial foundation 
of employment-based welfare system (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Cobb, 2012; Torres, 2009). The 
saliency of this labor restructuring was most vividly demonstrated by the prevalence of mass 
layoffs (Fligstein & Shin, 2007), which were encouraged and advanced by investment managers 
despite its “adverse human and organizational effects (Budros, 1997: 230).” The frequent layoffs 
and increased long-term unemployment (Hacker, 2006) consequently tainted the image of for-
profit corporations, depicting business as an uncaring, cold-blooded profit maximizer (Flanagan 
& O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Love & Kraatz, 2009). Therefore, as the massive layoffs become more 
prevalent, businesses in the field will be more strongly perceived as and expected to behave like 
a ruthless efficiency maximizer. This comprehensive negative characterization of all businesses 
may in turn lead organizational actors to develop a critical attitude towards the norm of 
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shareholder primacy, and urge them to opt out of the stigmatized identity by explicitly declaring 
that they are not ‘one of them’ but a different kind of business who are committed not just to 
profit but also to social and environmental impact. This sentiment was conspicuous in B 
Corporations’ own accounts. They distanced themselves from the “business as usual” by stating 
that “we cannot afford to do business in the 21st century the way that we did it in the 20th 
century.” They further highlighted they are of a fundamentally different kind, as claiming that 
“[B Corporation certification] is about proving that ‘doing well by doing good’ is a large and 
growing trend across industries, not a niche concept, and that it is the only sustainable way of 
doing business.”  
H5: the degree of layoff in the focal industry will be positively related to the emergence 
of B Corporations in the industry 
Negative consequences attributed to dominant rules not only engender a stigmatized 
identity but also creates greater grievance that can translate into a greater political opportunity 
for counter-institutional mobilization. While saving the organization from the undeserved 
stigmatization, claiming a deviant identity bears a substantial risk of being perceived illegitimate 
by the majority of audience who still subscribes to the dominant logic. The desire to mitigate this 
illegitimacy discount will likely turn the identity claim into a movement, a collective effort to 
alter the overall institutional framework (Rao et al., 2003). This movement can significantly 
benefit from the widespread grievance which highlights the inherent contradiction of the current 
system and fuels mobilization towards alternatives (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Also, the 
salient grievance accentuates the saliency of the political target, enabling insurgent actors to 
better articulate the alternative and more easily coalesce around the unified front (Bernstein, 
1997; Greve et al., 2006). These may in turn, increase the expected likelihood of the movement 
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success and subsequent institutional change, attracting more organizations to join the 
construction of ‘new normal.’  
The surge of inequality in the last decades of the 20th century has been frequently singled 
out as the most damaging social implication of economic financialization. Toaskovic-Devey and 
Lin (2011) showed that the long-term aggregate consequence of shareholder-focused corporate 
restructuring was the decrease of labor’s share in total income and the increase of the 
compensation of financial executives and top officers, resulting in the historic rise of income 
inequality. This increased inequality has gradually spawned widespread grievance throughout the 
society, and it was dramatically demonstrated through the Occupy Movement where the 
collective rage against the ever-widening gap between ‘1% and 99%’ burst out globally. It is 
highly likely that this historical trajectory fueled the perception of strong political opportunity for 
the mobilization against the shareholder-centered approach, which not only instills organizations 
with critical attitude toward status quo, but also pushes organizations to actively join the 
movement and coalesce under the alternative identity, such as the B Corporation label. In their 
own accounts, B Corporations emphasized that becoming a B Corporation is joining a movement 
where they “unify with other like-minded businesses” to achieve “a critical mass” that will 
“revolutionize ‘business as usual.’” Therefore, higher level of income inequality is likely to 
attract more organizations to join the B Corporation movement. 
H6: the degree of income inequality in the focal industry will be positively related to the 
emergence of B Corporations in the industry 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
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The unit of analysis is industry-year, based on the four-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) code. I observed the number of newly-certified B Corporations 
in each industry from 2007 to 2011. For the sampling frame, I used 272 four-digit NAICS 
industries which had at least one publicly-traded company during the time of observation. I 
chose this sampling frame because many of the industry characteristics (particularly those related 
to the financial indicators) were measurable only based on the database of publicly-traded firms.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was measured by counting the number of new B Corporation 
certifications in each industry-year. To construct this dataset, I took the following steps for each 
of 514 B Corporations that were certified up to 2011. First, I gathered information about each 
firm’s specific products or services by visiting the firm’s website as well as the company profile 
page on the B Lab website. Second, by comparing this information and the detailed description 
of each NAICS category available on US Census Bureau website (http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch), I assigned four-digit NAICS codes to each firm. Third, when a firm had 
multiple products/services aligned with different NAICS codes (which was rare for these small 
firms), I focused on the one product/service that was highlighted in the company profile page on 
the B Lab website, with the assumption that the firm’s commitment to this particular 
product/service is most relevant to the firm’s certification. When the B Lab's highlight was not 
sufficient to figure out major product/service, I chose the one that was described as the main 
product/service in the firm’s own website. In a very few cases where the major product/service 
was still not clear after these steps, I selected the one that was mentioned first in the focal firm’s 
own introductory statement. Finally, when multiple NAICS categories were identified as relevant 
to the focal B Corporation’s main product/service, I searched from the COMPUSTAT database 
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for the publicly-traded firms that share the same NAICS codes. Then I compared the 
products/services of these public firms and those of the focal B Corporation, and chose the 
NAICS code that is populated by the firms whose product/service is the most similar with that of 
the focal B Corporation. In other words, for the B Corporations whose major activity is relevant 
to multiple NAICS categories, I selected the industry where other registered publicly-traded 
firms have similar products/services. 
I went through this multi-stage coding procedure because sample firms are mostly small 
businesses that are not publicly-traded, with no official industry categorization available. 
Furthermore, although B Lab collects the data on self-reported industry categorization of each 
firm, these self-reported industries often fail to accurately reflect the firm’s products/services. In 
some cases, firms that have similar products are categorized in different codes, while those with 
very different services are classified in the same code. This seems to be the case not only because 
the semantics of industry code titles are often confusing, but also because entrepreneurs lack a 
detailed understanding of NAICS categorization scheme, which they have little incentive to 
master. For these reasons, I concluded that hand-coding of each firm’s industry code is possibly 
the most precise way to measure the industry distribution of B Corporations, and it resulted in 
the entire sample of 514 B Corporations to be categorized into 99 four-digit NAICS industries.  
Explanatory Variables 
I measured shareholder activism by counting the number of shareholder resolutions 
related to social issues per industry-year. The data were obtained from the Risk Metrics database, 
which provides the historical data of the shareholder resolutions and classifies them into two 
broad categories (governance issues and social issues). I counted the industry-wide number of 
the shareholder resolutions only on social issues based on the target firm’s primary NAICS code. 
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Consumer boycott was measured by counting the number of boycott events per industry-year, 
which were reported in the five national newspapers: New York Times, Washington Post, Wall 
Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times. I chose these five newspapers to 
reduce the potential regional bias, following earlier studies on consumer boycotts (King, 2008). I 
searched for the word “boycott” from the Factiva news database, which produced about 2,400 
news articles between 2006 and 2010. I then read each article and identified all reported boycott 
events during the time period. I included only the boycotts targeting specific firms or the specific 
products made by identifiable firms (boycotts targeting unidentifiable multiple businesses were 
excluded), only the boycotts that started within the period of observation, and the threatened 
boycotts (assuming that boycott threats reported in national media affected the entrepreneurial 
perception of the industry). I then counted the number of boycotts per industry-year based on the 
target firm’s primary NAICS code. Average age and education level of employees was measured 
by using the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS). I calculated industry-average 
age and education level from IPUMS-CPS March supplementary data for every year during the 
period of observation (King et al., 2010).  
The degree of layoff was measured by counting the number of mass layoff events per 
each industry-year. The data were obtained from the Mass Layoff Statistics database provided by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I used the annual counts of 4-digit-NAICS-level extended mass 
layoff events, which occurs when 50 or more workers file initial claims for unemployment 
insurance benefits against the same establishment during a consecutive 5-week period, with at 
least 50 workers separated for more than 30 days. The data for the degree of income inequality 
were also obtained from the IPUMS-CPS March supplementary data of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) (King et al., 2010). Following the earlier study on the effect of financialization on 
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income inequality (Tomaskovic-Devey & Lin, 2011), I measured income inequality by 
calculating the standard deviation of logged individual wage/salary income per industry-year.  
Control Variables 
Industry size was controlled for using industry-level number of firms and average 
employment, GDP by industry. Firm number and average employment data were collected using 
the Statistics of US Businesses data archive from US Census Bureau, and GDP by industry data 
were obtained from the database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. I also included industry 
profitability, to rule out the possibility that more B Corporations emerge in more profitable 
industries. Industry profitability was measured by the industry-level mean of return on asset, 
which was obtained from COMPUSTAT database. I also controlled for industry growth rate to 
account for the possibility that more B Corporations emerge in the fast-growing industries. The 
industry growth rate was measured by the percentage change of the number of establishments 
due to the birth of new establishments in each industry. I collected this measure from 
Employment Change data archive available from the Statistics of US Business data archive. I 
also included industry concentration data to control for the possible operation of resource 
partitioning process (Carroll, 1985). Given the specialist nature of B Corporations, organizational 
ecology perspective would suggest that more B Corporations are found in more concentrated 
industries, as B Corporations exploit specialist environmental niches that are left by consolidated 
generalists. To account for this possibility, I included Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for 
each industry using the corporate revenue data available from COMPUSTAT database. In 
addition, I controlled for organizational form diversity to account for the possibility that B 
Corporations are more prevalent in industries that are populated with diverse legal forms of 
organization. The Legal Form of Organization data from the US Census Bureau provides the 
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number of firms, employment size, and average revenue across 8 different legal forms (i.e., 
corporation, tax-exempt corporation, s-corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, government, 
others, and tax-exempt others) for each industry. I first calculated three Herfindal-Hirschman 
indices in terms of firm number, employment, and revenue for each industry,
2
 and used the 
diversity measure in terms of firm number due to the high correlation among three diversity 
measures. The result was similar when other diversity measures were used. Finally, to account 
for the possible density dependence process, I controlled for the accumulated number of B 
Corporations in each industry up to the year t-1.  
Analysis 
Because the dependent variable in this analysis is a count variable (i.e., number of the B 
Corporation certifications in each industry per year), either Poisson regression or negative 
binomial regression analysis is appropriate. The evidence of significant overdispersion 
(G2=67.80, p<.001) in the data suggested that negative binomial regression is more appropriate 
than Poisson regression (Long & Freese, 2005). I ran the main analysis using time-series 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) with the log link function and negative binomial 
distribution of dependent variable (Stata command: XTGEE). I chose this model over the fixed-
effects model because the data had a short and wide panel structure, where it is difficult for the 
fixed-effects model to produce consistent estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Also, I chose 
population-averaged estimates over the subject-specific random effects model because 
population-averaged model does not require the random-effects assumptions and is also 
consistent with this study’s focus on the average effect of external environment on the 
emergence of a deviant organizational identity. In addition, this technique is known to provide 
                                                          
2
    ∑   
  
 , where D is diversity measure and p is the percentage of firm number (or employment size, 
revenue) in each of 8 categories of organizational forms. 
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greater analytic precision for analysis involving dependent variables that are not normally 
distributed (such as binary or count variables) and clustered within a panel structure (Ballinger, 
2004; Zeger & Liang, 1986). 
I also considered zero-inflated models because the substantial portion of the industry-year 
did not experience a B Corporation certification during the time of observation. However, I 
chose the ordinary negative binomial model over zero-inflated model because the COUNTFIT 
procedure in STATA suggested that ordinary negative binomial model predicts a sufficient 
number of zero counts and fit better with the data. Also, with the zero-inflated models, the panel 
structure of the data cannot be properly taken into account, requiring that the model is run as if 
all the observations are cross-sectional.  
To define the accurate correlation structure that fits the data, I used QIC procedure in 
STATA that is designed to produce fit measures for the models based on GEE approach (Cui, 
2007). The results showed that independent correlation structure was best fitted with the current 
data. Therefore, the main analyses used the independent correlation structure. However, for the 
robustness check, I also conducted analyses assuming autoregressive correlation structure. 
Finally, the dependent variable was lagged by one year for a better interpretation of causal 
relationship, and I used Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to obtain cluster-robust 
standard errors. 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 3 reports pooled summary descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables. 
As Table 3 shows, correlations were generally low to moderate.  
================== 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
================== 
================== 
Insert Table 4 about here 
================== 
 Table 4 presents the result of negative binomial regressions of the number of B 
Corporations. Model 1 included only control variables. The results showed that more B 
Corporations were observed in the industries with more firms and more increases in the number 
of establishments. Also, it was found that the industry’s contribution to GDP was negatively 
related to the emergence of B Corporations, suggesting that B Corporations are more prone to 
emerge in smaller industries in terms of revenue. Contrast to resource partitioning prediction, 
concentration ratio was found to negatively affect the B Corporation emergence. This suggests 
that B Corporation is more likely to emerge in industries populated with many, smaller players, 
rather than a few consolidated firms. Another interesting pattern was found from the effect of 
organizational form diversity, which showed a negative effect on the number of B Corporations. 
This effect seemed to be driven by the fact that there were few B Corps in the industries such as 
education and healthcare which showed higher diversity in terms of legal forms (e.g., more tax-
exempt nonprofits, government organizations). This result indicates that B Corporations are 
more likely to originate more from for-profit businesses adopting a new identity, consistent with 
this study's theorizing. Finally, confirming the density dependence process, the accumulated 
number of B Corporations in the industry had a significant positive effect.  
 Model 2 presents the test of all Hypotheses. The results show that shareholder activism, 
measured by the number of shareholder resolutions related to social issues, had a significant 
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positive effect on the number of B Corporations, suggesting that Hypothesis 1 is supported. One 
standard deviation increase of shareholder activism increased the rate of the B Corporation 
certification by 24%.  The effect of consumer boycott was found to be less strong (p=.050), 
providing a marginal support for Hypotheses 2. As for the employee demographics, only the 
effect of average education was found to be significant, supporting Hypotheses 4, while the 
effect of average age was found to be non-significant, failing to support Hypotheses 3. With one 
standard deviation increase of the average education level, the predicted rate of the B 
Corporation emergence increased from .188 to .237 (26%). These results generally supported the 
argument that B Corporations were more likely to emerge in industries where major stakeholders 
exhibit the signs of divergence from the shareholder-centered logic. Further, Model 2 also 
showed that the effect of mass layoffs was found to be significant and positive, supporting 
Hypothesis 5. For one standard deviation increase in the number of mass layoff events, the 
predicted rate of the B Corporation emergence increased by 23%, holding all other variables 
constant. Similarly, the degree of income inequality was also found to significantly increase the 
number of B Corporations, lending support to Hypothesis 6. With one standard deviation 
increase of income inequality, the predicted rate of the B Corporation certification increased 
from .191 to .239 (25% increase). Taken together, these results supported the argument that the 
claim of the B Corporation identity is more likely when the negative consequences of the 
shareholder value maximization are more salient. 
Robustness Checks 
 The results of the main analysis are based on the statistical assumption that the 
correlation structure in the data is independent. I chose this correlation structure because the QIC 
measure showed that independent correlation structure had the best fit with the data. However, 
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considering that a more intuitive assumption is auto-correlation, where the errors are correlated 
over time and this correlation dissipates over time, I ran a supplementary analysis with an 
autoregressive correlation structure that sets the within-panel correlations as an exponential 
function of one year (AR1). The result, presented in Model 3 and 4 in Table 4, was similar with 
the main analysis except that the effect of consumer boycott in the main analysis disappeared in 
this supplementary analysis. In other words, all the explanatory variables were found 
significantly predict the emergence of B Corporations, except for consumer boycott and 
employee age.  
 In addition, to examine whether the findings of the main analysis accurately capture the 
general process underlying data, I have conducted another supplementary analysis, a cross-
sectional analysis with the accumulated number of B Corporations throughout the period of 
observation as the dependent variable. Given the short panel structure of the data (5 years), the 
results of the cross-sectional analysis should be close to the results of the panel data analysis, but 
may not be equivalent given the significant reduction in sample size. I ran a cross-sectional 
generalized linear model (GLM) with the log link function and negative binomial distribution, in 
which explanatory variables in 2007 predicted the entire number of B Corporations certified 
throughout 2007 to 2011, controlling for the number of B Corporations in the first year. I also 
ran the models with other specifications (e.g., using predictors in 2006 or 2008, using dependent 
variables pooled across different time periods), and the results were similar. As shown in Model 
5 and 6 in Table 4, the results were similar with the main analysis in terms of the overall 
direction of effect, but the size of effect was generally weaker. As presented in Model 6 the 
effect of shareholder activism was in the same direction but marginally significant (p<.10). The 
effect of consumer boycott was not significant. In this analysis, while the effect of average 
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education was found non-significant, the effect of age was found significant at a marginal level 
(p<.10). The effects of the degree of layoff and income inequality were still found to be 
significant in the predicted direction. Despite the changes in the effect size, the outcome of the 
cross-sectional analysis generally corresponded to that of the panel data analysis, providing 
additional confidence to the overall findings. The differences between the two analyses can be 
attributable to much smaller sample size, as well as a possible nonlinear change in some 
explanatory variables across the years of observation. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study sought for a theoretical explanation of why organizations with an explicit 
commitment to non-financial stakeholders proliferate in the financialized economy that is 
founded upon the principle of shareholder primacy. This empirical puzzle invoked a theoretical 
question of how and when organizations adopt an identity that is deviant from the prescription of 
the dominant institutional logic. Informed by an inductive content analysis on B Corporations, a 
growing form of social enterprise, I identified two mechanisms driving the adoption of an 
institutionally-deviant identity. First, organizational actors strategically adopt a deviant identity 
to appeal to the preference of stakeholders who are disembedded from the dominant logic. 
Second, organizations may also adopt a deviant identity in a form of political movement to 
dissociate themselves from the current system and challenge the dominant logic. To further test 
these mechanisms, I developed hypotheses on the facilitating conditions of deviant identity 
claims. I hypothesized that strategic deviant identity claims will be more likely in the context 
where the dominant logic is undermined as more stakeholders exhibit discontent with the 
existing logic. I also expected that political deviant identity claims will be more likely in the 
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context where the dominant logic is more strongly enforced, creating negative consequences and 
subsequent stigmatization of embedded actors. The empirical test using archival data of B 
Corporations and their industry characteristics generally supported both predictions, showing 
that more B Corporations emerged not only in the context where stakeholders demonstrated the 
sign of departure from the imperative of shareholder value maximization, but also in the 
industries where the negative consequences of economic financialization were salient.  
These findings provide a major implication to the institutional perspective of 
organizational identity by showing that organizations form identity not only in conformity with 
the dominant institutional logic but also in resistance to it. Recently, Glynn (2008) called for a 
departure from the traditional view that institutions are ‘constraining’ and proposed an 
alternative view that institutions can be ‘enabling’ a novel organizational identity through 
provision of symbols and meanings. Building on this pioneering insight, this study’s findings 
suggest another route through which Institutions can affect the emergence of novel identities, 
namely, a motivational route. As institutional forces create a stronger drive towards 
homogenization, institutions impose a common identity on all embedded actors. When the 
dominant institution is associated with negativity, this institutionally-imposed identity can 
collide with the actors’ desire for a positive self-view. This discrepancy may in turn lead 
organizations to engage in critical self-reflection, which is the core foundation of organizational 
identity formation (Gioia et al., 2013). This institutionally-provoked self-reflection would then 
provide the motivational fuel for organizations to more strongly embrace their distinctiveness 
from what is institutionally expected, and consequently to publicly claim their uniqueness 
through identifying with a deviant social category. Although this study provided a preliminary 
test of this theoretical narrative, a detailed examination of the process and its applicability to 
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other contexts is still in question. Further elaboration of this ‘motivational route’ through which 
institutions engender a novel identity will significantly contribute to expanding the current 
institutional view of organizational identities. 
This research also contributes to the research on institutional change by highlighting that 
the divergence from the dominant logic can be driven by both strong and weak institutional 
constraints, simultaneously. The literature has thus far implied two opposing views on how the 
strength of the existing logic affects subsequent changes to the logic. Research on institutional 
plurality and complexity suggested that the institutional change is more likely when the 
constraint of a existing logic weakens by the introduction and co-presence of multiple logics 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008), whereas 
another group of researchers maintained that stronger constraint by the dominant logic leads to 
greater contradiction, promoting stronger resistance to the existing order and greater motivation 
for change (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002). This study’s findings suggest that 
these distinct and somewhat contradictory theoretical processes can empirically coexist in the 
messy process of institutional change. Specifically, public claims of the B Corporation identity 
represent the divergence from the dominant shareholder logic. This divergence emerged not only 
out of the institutional complexity, increased by the stakeholders subscribing to the alternative 
stakeholder theory, but also from a stronger enforcement of the dominant logic where the 
shareholder value logic was more forcefully instantiated in the form of intensive labor 
restructurings. This simultaneous operation of seemingly contradictory mechanisms deserves 
more attention. One possible explanation is that this study’s findings reflect the temporal 
coexistence of distinctive sequential steps in institutional change. It is plausible that the change 
process is initiated by those who are driven by institutional contradiction, causing early cracks in 
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the taken-for-grantedness of the existing rules. The temporal accumulation of such damages may 
gradually weaken the constraint of the existing logic, allowing the encroachment of alternative 
logics. Then, actors may be able to detect the strategic benefit of divergence by subscribing to 
the alternative logic. To put differently, the political resistance may create a fuse for divergence, 
which gets ignited later by the following strategic adoptions. In the lengthy process of 
institutional evolution, however, these steps may not be clearly separable. Rather, it is possible 
that these different processes coexist to constitute the messy process of institutional change.  
Another notable aspect of this study’s findings is that the salient presence of the dominant 
institutional logic did not lead to stronger constraints but to more visible resistance. This finding 
may possibly contradict with the central thesis of institutional theory: institutions constrain. In 
the current research, this apparent lack of institutional constraint can be attributable to the 
structural position of the actors who readily embraced the B Corporation identity. It is important 
to note that most of the firms in the B Corporation community are small- or medium-sized 
private firms, whose location in the field is possibly closer to the margin, not the core. It is 
possible that this marginal position of these actors made them less structurally constrained and 
enabled them to more actively engage in a preemptive action to mitigate the institutional pressure 
that may be exerted on them as they grow and move towards the core (Battilana, Leca, & 
Boxenbaum, 2009). Metaphorically, the constraint of the dominant logic described here is 
similar to pressing bread dough. When stronger pressure is exerted at the center of the dough, the 
center becomes flatter while the periphery puffs up. It is possible that in the field with a stronger 
enforcement of the shareholder logic, bigger public corporations may find it even more difficult 
to deviate from the prescription of shareholder primacy, while smaller firms on the fringe are 
more likely to strive for the B Corporation certification. To extend this idea, if big companies 
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became certified as a B Corporation, it will be more likely that they come from the industries 
where the emphasis on shareholder value maximization is less conspicuous. This differential 
reaction to the dominant institutional logic across the core and periphery of the filed deserves 
more attention in the future studies. 
Finally, this research provides implication to the literature of hybrid organizations by 
situating the recent emergence of hybrid organizations in the concrete historical context of the 
economic financialization. The emerging literature on social-economic hybrid organization and 
social entrepreneurship significantly expanded our knowledge on the unique challenges to this 
novel type of organizations, including how they integrate disparate member identities that 
originated from social versus economic backgrounds (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) and how they 
synthesize potentially conflicting institutional logics (Tracey et al., 2011). The current research 
builds on this stream of research by adding a more political and historical perspective that has 
been largely absent in the literature (Dacin et al., 2011). By so doing, the current research 
responds to the frequently raised skepticisms on the novelty of social-economic hybrid 
organizations.  
The novelty of hybrid organizations and social entrepreneurship has often been 
questioned, given that traditional for-profit businesses have also pursued diverse stakeholder 
benefits, in addition to shareholder value. In fact, constituency statutes in corporate laws of most 
states have long allowed for-profit businesses to legally pursue the interests of diverse 
stakeholders. Then why are we observing the surge of a special class of businesses explicitly 
committed to non-financial stakeholders now? To answer these questions, it is important to keep 
eyes on the macro context of this phenomenon. This research suggests the phenomenon of social 
entrepreneurship is indeed novel when being considered within the concrete institutional context 
37 
 
of the financialization of the US economy. Without considering this historical context, what 
social entrepreneurs do these days may not look very different from what Henry Ford did to his 
workers and the local communities in Detroit through philanthropic giving. However, with the 
historical backdrop of ever-increasing emphasis on shareholder value maximization, social 
entrepreneurship is clearly a novel endeavor and a deviant experiment, with a potential to 
constitute a seed for structural changes to the contemporary economy. Therefore, bringing in a 
historical perspective augments the reason why we need to continuously develop this emerging 
literature.  
One major limitation of this research is that due to its reliance on archival data, it lacked a 
close empirical examination of the processual mechanisms connecting the macro-level 
environmental characteristics (i.e., industry-level predictors) and the micro-level entrepreneurial 
decisions (i.e., adoption of B Corporation identity). Although this void was partially filled by 
incorporating qualitative evidence, this study still largely infers the process from the statistical 
association between the observed variables. To address this limitation, it is recommended to 
conduct an in-depth field research on the process through which social enterprises are initially 
constructed and how such processes are affected by manifestation of the current institutional 
environment. Different methodological approaches, such as ethnography of the early-stage 
processes of nascent social entrepreneurs, would provide a richer account of how institutions 
create the seeds for its own historical change through individual entrepreneurs’ situated 
motivations and actions.  
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Table 1  Industrial distribution of B Corporations 
2nd order category 1st order category B Corp examples 
Number of B 
Corps 
Number of B 
Corps 
Percent
age 
Agriculture Farming Organic farming 3 3 0.58 
Environment 
Construction 
Green building construction (non-
residential) 
11 
46 8.97 
Energy Solar energy installation 21 
Environmental 
service 
Cleaning service 3 
Transportation Operating bike transit centers 1 
Waste management Recycler, waste treatment 10 
FIRE 
Financial service 
Investment management (as agent), 
mutual fund manager 
56 
71 13.84 
Insurance Retirement plan 7 
Real estate Real estate property developers 8 
Information, communication, & 
technology 
Communication Wired telecommunications 2 
82 15.98 Media Book Publishers 11 
Technology Software Publishers 69 
Manufacture 
Clothing T-Shirts & general clothing 18 
115 22.42 
Food Coffee & tea roaster 39 
Household/personal 
goods 
Organic soap, detergent, and other cleaner 41 
Medicine/Medical 
equipment 
Medical diagnostic equipment 10 
Office supplies Paper product 7 
Personal service 
Education Sports and recreation instruction 15 
24 4.68 
Other service Restaurant 9 
Professional service 
Accounting service CPA office 3 
142 27.68 
Consulting service Management consulting 57 
Design service Green Interior design 8 
Legal service Law firm 13 
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Logistics service Logistics service 3 
Marketing service Branding, marketing, advertisement 32 
Other professional 
service 
Employment placement agency 13 
Technical service Architectural service 13 
Wholesale/Retail 
Retailer (food) Food co-ops 1 
30 5.85 
Retailer (medicine) Pharmacy & drug store 1 
Retailer (office) Office supply and stationery retailer 6 
Retailer (others) Online shopping 15 
Wholesale 
(environment) 
Nursery wholesaler 1 
Wholesale (food) Seafood wholesaler 4 
Wholesale (home) Home improvement material wholesaler 1 
Wholesale (other) Foundry product wholesaler 1 
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Figure 1  Annual change of industry composition of B Corporations 
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Table 2  Content analysis on the motivation for the  B Corporation Certification 
Type of 
Mechanism 
2nd-order codes 1st-order codes Frequency Percentage Representative quotes 
Strategic 
Action 
External 
competition focus 
To set an example for other businesses 22 5.64 
"set an example of social and environmental responsibility 
in our community" 
"[name of company] aspire to be models for both the eco-
building and ecotourism industries, and to demonstrate the 
benefit of conservation in our daily operations" 
To differentiate from competitors (e.g., 
other ‘green-washers’) through 
certification 
19 4.87 
" it publically demonstrates a commitment to our core 
values, allows us to demonstrate active social leadership, 
and enables us to differentiate our company’s competitive 
positioning." 
"to demonstrate that we are different from our competitors 
and are far from traditional in our project approach"  
External 
communication 
focus 
To communicate their commitment to 
social entrepreneurship to the general 
public 
38 9.74 
"help announce our corporate values with third party 
validation" 
To communicate their commitment to 
social entrepreneurship to the 
stakeholders 
28 7.18 
"to demonstrate our commitment to our community, 
employees, consumers, environment and suppliers" 
To communicate their commitment to 
social entrepreneurship to consumers, 
clients, and partners 
21 5.38 
"It communicates to our clients that we are a changed, 
serious and committed firm in our field." 
Profit-purpose 
balance 
To demonstrate that businesses 
committed to non-economic 
(environmental and social) bottom lines 
can also be more profitable 
21 5.38 
"because companies that embrace all of their stakeholders 
generate greater returns for their investors over the long 
run." 
Instrumental 
benefit of 
certification 
To collaborate with, learn from other B 
Corps 
37 9.49 
"to continue learning new ways in which we can expand our 
social and environmental impact through networking with 
other like-minded (and better) companies." 
To improve organizational practice for 
sustainability, check progress in mission 
28 7.18 
"Our B Corp certification helps ensure we will continually 
aim higher and further improve our social and 
environmental approach to doing business." 
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Political 
Action 
Identity 
preservation focus 
To formalize, confirm ‘what we have 
already been’ 
102 26.15 
"We share the social and environmental values defined by B 
Lab and we want to demonstrate our commitment to those 
ideals by writing them into our corporate structure." 
"to formalize its dual commitment to giving back to the 
community and conserving the environment. " 
"We were a social enterprise before even knowing the term" 
"we wanted to add an esteemed legitimacy to our social and 
environmental efforts" 
To be held accountable for practicing 
what we preach 
44 11.28 
"became a B Corporation in order to “walk the talk,” 
"being a B Corp is our way of embedding our commitment 
into the DNA of our business." 
Social change 
focus 
To publicly redefine the way of doing 
business 
71 18.21 
"While business is the problem, we believe that business 
can, and must be, the primary solution. The B Corporation 
Certification is one important step forward on this journey." 
"It is about proving that "doing well by doing good" is a 
large and growing trend across industries, not a niche 
concept, and that it is the only sustainable way of doing 
business." 
To be a part of the fundamental 
change/shift in the way business is done 
53 13.59 
"We believe in business as the lever of change in society - - 
to achieve this and create critical mass, we must bond 
together to create a new economy with a new set of rules. " 
"Business must be reimagined in the 21st century so that 
companies can be financially profitable while also being 
socially responsible and ecologically beneficial. B Corps 
are taking the lead in making this vision a reality." 
Because we believe we are a different 
type 
7 1.79 
"because it is the only model that makes sense for our 
business. Our purpose matches the non-profit model while 
our structure lines up with the for-profit route. We felt 
relieved when we learned we could become a B 
corporation, a "for-benefit enterprise." 
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Because we did not like the way business 
was being done 
6 1.54 
"believe that the major crises of our time are a result of the 
way we conduct business; as a B Corp we’re a part of the 
solution." 
"we cannot afford to do business in the 21st century the way 
that we did it in the 20th century. " 
Collective action 
focus 
To join/support/contribute to the 
movement with other like-minded 
businesses 
95 24.36 
"believe in unifying with other like-minded companies and 
organizations to revolutionize ‘business as usual’." 
"to be part of the collective voice of companies that are 
about integrity, responsibility, sustainability and doing good 
in the world can instead of being just about profits." 
To promote the growth of the movement 26 6.67 
"support the widespread adoption of the B Corp standards 
and mission by many, many other organizations" 
"We believe that by similar companies coming together our 
collective voice will be stronger than our individual voices 
alone. We believe this new voice will attract new 
companies to share in the triple bottom line vision" 
N=390 
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Variable Mean s.d. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Number of B Corps 0.44 1.46 0 16 
             2 Mass layoff 30.70 57.07 0 666 0.09 
            3 Income inequality 0.92 0.20 0.17 1.54 0.06 0.03 
           4 Shareholder activism 1.41 3.29 0 31 0.05 0.04 -0.06 
          5 Consumer boycott 0.09 0.42 0 5 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.16 
         6 Average age 41.53 2.93 28.74 51.31 0.03 -0.13 -0.38 -0.06 -0.21 
        7 Average education 2.78 0.47 1.79 4.20 0.27 -0.17 0.20 0.11 -0.03 0.20 
       8 Firm numbera 8.68 1.78 2.77 12.19 0.20 0.21 0.37 -0.09 0.06 -0.28 0.07 
      9 Average employment sizea 3.52 1.16 1.25 9.95 -0.13 0.07 -0.28 0.32 0.07 0.06 0.02 -0.69 
     10 GDP by industry 2.37 2.25 0.10 12.00 0.02 0.02 0.28 -0.03 -0.01 -0.18 0.12 0.52 -0.36 
    11 Profitability (ROA) -0.01 0.22 -1.87 0.64 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.11 -0.05 
   12 Establishment birth 9.49 4.65 1.56 54.79 0.17 0.00 0.25 -0.01 0.09 -0.20 0.18 0.21 -0.23 0.09 -0.12 
  13 Concentration ratioa -1.27 0.84 -4.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.16 -0.44 -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 0.05 -0.34 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 
 14 Organizational form diversity 0.67 0.04 0.61 0.80 -0.07 -0.08 0.38 0.02 0.05 -0.25 0.19 0.19 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.29 0.07 
N=970 
a 
Log-transformed
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Table 4  Negative binomial regression of the number of B Corporations 
Variables 
Model 1 
(XTGEE) 
Model 2 
(XTGEE) 
Model 3 
(XTGEE) 
Model 4 
(XTGEE) 
Model 5 
(GLM) 
Model 6 
(GLM) 
              
Firm number
a
 0.312*** 0.159
+
 0.326*** 0.181* 0.278* 0.169 
 
(0.0853) (0.0871) (0.0851) (0.0886) (0.110) (0.115) 
Average employment size
a
 0.0402 -0.215 -0.0174 -0.240 -0.129 -0.235 
 
(0.160) (0.181) (0.177) (0.193) (0.214) (0.222) 
GDP by industry -0.153* -0.178* -0.177** -0.203** -0.184* -0.198** 
 
(0.0613) (0.0707) (0.0622) (0.0726) (0.0791) (0.0761) 
Profitability (ROA) -0.148 -0.247 0.311 0.270 0.405 0.417 
 
(0.348) (0.326) (0.359) (0.374) (0.300) (0.314) 
Establishment birth 0.0386* 0.0279 0.0470* 0.0393* 0.0565* 0.0467
+
 
 
(0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0241) (0.0260) 
Concentration ratio
a
 -0.364** -0.283* -0.361** -0.278* -0.626*** -0.505** 
 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.135) (0.173) (0.169) 
Organizational form diversity -7.886* -10.77** -9.569** -12.14*** -8.857* -12.06** 
 
(3.115) (3.327) (3.262) (3.406) (3.779) (3.683) 
B Corp density 0.269*** 0.230*** 0.180*** 0.170*** 0.900*** 0.828*** 
 
(0.0184) (0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0195) (0.249) (0.231) 
Shareholder activism 
 
0.0694** 
 
0.0689** 
 
0.0673
+
 
  
(0.0248) 
 
(0.0245) 
 
(0.0399) 
Consumer boycott 
 
0.239
+
 
 
0.122 
 
0.206 
  
(0.122) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.183) 
Average age 
 
0.0159 
 
0.0263 
 
0.0969
+
 
  
(0.0400) 
 
(0.0388) 
 
(0.0567) 
Average education 
 
0.479* 
 
0.512* 
 
0.187 
  
(0.203) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.253) 
Mass layoff 
 
0.00386*** 
 
0.00402*** 
 
0.00645* 
  
(0.000993) 
 
(0.000933) 
 
(0.00273) 
Income inequality 
 
1.095* 
 
1.086* 
 
1.987** 
  
(0.470) 
 
(0.457) 
 
(0.690) 
Constant -1.257*** -1.244*** -1.152*** -1.161*** -0.112 0.145 
 
(0.143) (0.157) (0.151) (0.162) (0.213) (0.218) 
Observations 970 970 964 964 240 240 
Number of NAICS4 industry 253 253 247 247 
  chi2 428.1 425.2 364.9 386.6 77.51 123.7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, 
+ 
p<0.10 
    
a 
Log-transformed 
 
 
